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Abstract: Recent work on optimal monetary and scal policy in New Keyne-
sian models has tended to focus on policy set by an innitely-lived benevolent
policy maker, often with access to a commitment technology. In this paper,
we explore deviations from this ideal, by allowing (time-consistent) policy to
be set by a process of bargaining between two political players with di¤erent
weights on elements of the social welfare function. We characterize the (linear)
Markov perfect equilibrium and, in a series of numerical examples, we explore
the resultant policy response to shocks which cannot be perfectly o¤set with
the available instruments due to their scal consequences. We nd that, even
although the players, on average, have the socially desirable objective function,
the process of bargaining implies an outcome which deviates from the time-
consistent policy chosen by the benevolent policy maker. Moreover, the range
1
of instruments available mean that policy makers will bargain across the entire
policy mix, sometimes implying outcomes which are quite di¤erent from those
that would be chosen by a single policy maker. These policy outcomes depend
crucially on the nature of the conict and also the level of government debt.
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1 Introduction
Work on optimal monetary and scal policy in New Keynesian models has
tended to focus on policy set by an innitely-lived benevolent policy maker,
often with access to a commitment technology.1 If the ideal of a single policy
1 Inuential examples include Benigno and Woodford (2003) and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe
(2004).
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maker implementing a Ramsey plan is relaxed, this tends to be done in two
possible ways. First, the literature has dropped the assumption that the pol-
icy maker is able to commit, and considered the case of time-consistent policy
making.2 Second, some papers have also introduced multiple policy makers
by allowing an independent central bank to interact with a government setting
scal policy.3
In this paper we further explore deviations from the ideal of a benevolent
policy maker with access to a commitment technology, by allowing policy to
be set by a process of bargaining between two players with di¤erent attitudes
towards the appropriate weights on elements of the social welfare function. The
exact denition of these playersis quite exible. The simplest interpretation
is of two political parties operating as a coalition government, but it can also
encompass conict between branches of the legislature; a minority government
and the opposition; ministries within a majority government; and even conict
between a government and delegated policy making institution such as an inde-
2 In the context of sticky price models, time-consistent monetary and scal policy is an-
alyzed in, for example, Niemann and Pichler (2011), Niemann et al. (2013b), Leith and
Wren-Lewis (2013), Leeper et al. (2016) and Leeper and Leith (2016). Additionally, starting
with Lucas and Stokey (1983) there are numerous papers exploring the time-consistency of
scal policy in the context of exible price economies subject to monetary frictions (see for
example, Obstfeld (1991, 1997), Nicolini (1998), Ellison and Rankin (2007), Diaz-Gimenez et
al. (2008), Martin (2009), and Aiuagari et al. (2002)).
3A classic reference for this approach is Currie and Levine (1993), while recent examples
include Niemann and Pilcher (2011), Niemann et al. (2013a), Adam and Billi (2014), Chen
et al. (2017) and Bai et al. (2018).
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pendent central bank. These players, then, alternate in making proposals over
the policy mix (consisting of monetary policy and tax and government spending
levels) until agreement is reached and policy implemented. The key di¤erence
between this approach and the typical analysis of strategic conict between a
government and an independent central bank is that our approach focuses on
bargained policy outcomes rather than strategic interactions between two play-
ers with separate control over a subset of policy instruments. This enables our
approach to capture a wider range of conicting policy maker objectives and
reect the reality that policy typically emerges as a result of the interactions of
many actors.4 ;5
In terms of modelling, we extend the dynamic bargaining game of Flamini
(2012) to the case of an innite number of bargaining stages and embed it in
a New Keynesian Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model. In
the model economy, households supply labor to imperfectly competitive rms
4We are able to sustain a wide range of interpretations of the nature of the conict as the
bargaining process determines the agreed equilibrium policy mix of available monetary and
scal instruments, but does not require any particular distribution of control of policy instru-
ments across players. Therefore, it does not matter whether the agreed policy is implemented
by individual government ministries, di¤erent branches of the legislature or distinct monetary
and scal authorities etc. What is important is that the overall policy mix is determined by
a process of bargaining, which is not a¤ected by the identity of who implements the agreed
policy. In essence, our players represent di¤erent sources of inuence over the policy making
process rather than the technicians implementing policy.
5 In section 6, we augment our model to include an independent central bank interacting
strategically alongside two political players who bargain over the scal policy mix. This
enables us to contrast our approach with the more conventional one.
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who are only able to adjust prices after random intervals of time (as in Calvo
(1983)). We construct a social welfare measure based on the utility of the
households populating this economy. The policy instruments available to policy
makers are interest rates, an income tax and government expenditure. In the
absence of a government nancing constraint, this would be a su¢ cient array
of instruments to achieve the rst best allocation. However, aside from any
frictions caused by the presence of bargaining, policy makers need to balance
the desire to o¤set the costs of shocks in a sticky-price environment against the
need to satisfy their intertemporal budget constraint. This is clearly of relevance
given the number of countries who grappled with both rising unemployment and
government debt following the recent credit crunch. The use of a wide range
of policy instruments, aside from being realistic, also implies that there can be
many dimensions along which compromises can be made in reaching agreement
over the policy mix.
We show that the use of the various instruments to stabilize debt following
shocks can be very di¤erent with and without bargaining. In a series of exam-
ples we focus on conict over the relative importance of stabilizing ination,
government spending and private consumption, respectively, during the period
of scal adjustment.6 In the absence of bargaining, and in the presence of a
positive shock to debt, government spending falls. The remainder of the pol-
icy mix depends, crucially, on the level of debt since this a¤ects the relative
6Conict over the desirability of stabilizing the consumption gap serves as a proxy for
conict over the use of monetary policy in stabilizing debt since uctuations in consumption
are due to movements in real interest rates in our New Keynesian economy.
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e¢ cacy of alternative policy instruments. At lower debt levels, spending cuts
are accompanied by tax rises and a tightening of monetary policy to moderate
ination. At higher debt levels monetary policy becomes a far more e¤ective
means of stabilizing debt, and interest rates are cut to boost the tax base and
reduce debt service costs. In this case, tax rates may actually fall to mitigate
the rise in ination caused by the relaxation of monetary policy.
The policy outcomes can be quite di¤erent in the presence of bargaining,
with parties possessing di¤erent degrees of aversion to the use of a particular
instrument/policy objective relative to other elements in the welfare function
(although on average policy makerspreferences mirror those of society).
When conict is over the degree of ination conservatism, typically the pol-
icy maker who is less averse to ination will be able to achieve a bargained
outcome closer to his preferences, especially as debt levels rise. This is due
to the fact that ination is such an e¤ective means of reducing debt that she
will be able to compensate the other policy maker with favorable movements in
other welfare relevant variables. When the conict is over the stabilization of
public consumption, the nature of the concessions depends crucially on the level
of debt. At low debt levels, government spending is a relatively e¤ective policy
instrument and the policy maker who wishes to encourage its use can achieve
agreement by reducing the adjustment required in other welfare relevant vari-
ables. At higher debt levels this is not the case, and the policy maker who
wishes to rely less heavily on spending cuts achieves this in the bargained policy
outcome. Finally, when conict is over the volatility of private consumption,
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(which, indirectly, is a proxy for the use of monetary policy as a stabilization
device) we nd that bargaining always reduces the reliance on this instrument,
although, whether it is taxes or ination which takes up the slack, depends on
whether debt levels are low or high, respectively.
Introducing an ination-averse independent central bank implies a tighter
monetary policy in the face of scal shocks such that ination is lower for a
given level of debt. The moderation of ination reduces the incentives of the
scal players to agree a rapid correction of debt. This is quite di¤erent from the
case of bargained policy outcomes - the less ination averse player is able to
extract concessions from the other player due to the relative e¢ cacy of surprise
ination as a device to stabilize debt, raising the speed of scal correction.
Therefore, policy resulting from strategic interactions between policy makers
in control of specic instruments can be quite di¤erent from bargained policy
outcomes, as the latter take account of the costs and benets of alternative
policies for ones opponents when attempting to reach agreement.
Our paper also touches on a number of additional literatures. Firstly, analy-
ses of the interaction between coalition politics and scal policy have typically
focussed on the possibility of a decit bias, due to either a common pool problem,
where multiple policy makers do not internalize the full costs of their spending
decisions (see, for example, Velasco (2000)) or a war of attrition (see Alesina and
Drazen (1991), Drazen and Grilli (1993), Spolaore (2004) and Martinelli and Es-
corza (2007)), where scal consolidations are delayed as political factions battle
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over who shall bear the costs.7 Unlike our paper, which employs a sticky-price
economy, these models do not include a macroeconomic stabilization role for
scal policy, but instead focus on real economies requiring scal consolidation.
Secondly, our paper extends the literature on dynamic bargaining. Although
such a dynamic element is a typical feature of many long-run negotiations,
within Game Theory these have rarely been investigated. Recent exceptions
are Sorger (2006), within a cooperative framework, and Flamini (2012), within
a non-cooperative framework. Finally, there is an extensive literature on pub-
lic goods provision, where that provision can be subject to bargaining between
players. See, for example, Bowen et al. (2014) which investigates two parties
who have to decide over public spending under a simple bargaining procedure
(take-it-or-leave-it) with the crucial feature that in disagreement they either
spend nothing (discretionary spending) or must implement the previous years
budget (mandatory spending). Hence, the status quo which emerges in the
absence of agreement is endogenous in the latter.
Embedding a dynamic bargaining framework within a DSGE model, as we
do, is even richer than such analyses. This complexity arises in three ways.
Firstly, the macroeconomic outcomes that players care about depend not only
7The war of attrition literature, typically, does not allow for bargaining between coalition
partners. Instead, due to asymmetric information over the costs each faces under a given
consolidation plan, coalition partners slowly edge towards agreement as they try to obtain
information about the others cost function. Notable exceptions are Hsieh (2000), Sibert and
Perraudin (2000) and Katayama (2008) where bargaining over the burden of consolidation
facilitates the extraction of information about the costs the other player faces.
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on agreements reached today, but on expectations of the policies that will be
agreed and implemented tomorrow. Secondly, the agreements reached today
will a¤ect the government debt stock inherited in the future which will a¤ect
the bargaining that takes place in the future. Finally, the agreed policies must
also be time-consistent as we assume that the coalition government does not
have access to a commitment technology which enables it to make promises it
would subsequently wish to break.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we outline our model in
which consumers supply labor to imperfectly competitive rms who are only
able to change prices at random intervals of time. Workers labor income is
taxed, and the government consumes and issues debt. In Section 3 we derive
a second-order approximation to welfare for these households and describe how
individual policy maker preferences di¤er from this benchmark. In Section 4, we
analyze the bargaining game and derive the Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE)
policies. These, then, inform the simulation results in section 5. Sections 6
and 7 explore two extensions: the introduction of an independent central bank
and non-separable preferences in private and public consumption, respectively.
Section 8 concludes.
2 The Model
This section outlines our model of the underlying economy. The model is a stan-
dard New Keynesian DSGE model, but augmented to include the governments
9
budget constraint where government spending is nanced by distortionary tax-
ation and/or borrowing. This basic set-up is similar to that in Benigno and
Woodford (2003) and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004) but with some di¤erences
as detailed in Leith and Wren-Lewis (2013). Firstly, we allow the government
to vary government spending in an optimal way, rather than simply treating
government spending as an exogenous ow which must be nanced. Secondly,
we eliminate the usual inationary bias caused by an ine¢ ciently low level of
steady-state output due to imperfect competition and distortionary taxes, by
introducing a subsidy nanced by lump-sum taxes.8 However, we do not allow
further use of lump-sum taxes to nance government spending and ensure scal
solvency following shocks, instead governments must adjust spending and/or
income taxes to ensure scal sustainability. The use of this steady-state sub-
sidy enables us to formulate a valid linear-quadratic problem with which to
analyze time-consistent linear MPE strategies in a DSGE model where policy
is conducted by a process of bargaining. The use of higher order perturbation
methods in order to avoid the use of the subsidy, is complicated by the need
to identify the steady-state of the solution to the non-linear problem which
8Leith and Wren-Lewis (2013) discusses alternative motivations for considering an e¢ cient
steady state without recourse to subsidies nanced by lump-sum taxes: for example, contem-
poraneous consumption externalities which o¤set distortionary taxes (Levine et al., 2008),
an ability to commit to the steady state of a Ramsey problem, but not to how the economy
responds to shocks (Levine and Pearlman, 2011) or through a tax on leisure rather than work
(Bilbiie et al., 2008). Our basic policy problem is una¤ected by the choice of device used to
render the steady-state e¢ cient.
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depends upon derivatives of the value function (see, for example, Klein et al.
(2008) and Martin (2009)), while the use of global projection methods (see Heer
and Maussner (2009) chapter 6 for a discussion) in an economy where policy is
implemented through a process of bargaining is beyond the scope of the current
paper.
Next, we examine the households problem, before turning to the rms
problem.
2.1 Households
There is a continuum of households of size one. We shall assume full asset mar-
kets, such that, through risk sharing, they will face the same budget constraint.
As a result the typical household will seek to maximize the following objective
function,
E0
1X
t=0
tU(Ct; Nt; Gt; t; 
N
t ) (1)
where Ct,Gt and Nt are a consumption aggregate, a public goods aggregate,
and labor supply respectively,  is the discount factor, t is a time preference
shock, Nt is a labor supply shock.
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The consumption aggregate is dened as,
Ct =
Z 1
0
Ct(j)
 1
 dj
 
 1
(2)
where j denotes the goods type or variety. The public goods aggregate takes
9For reasons of tractability, all shocks are assumed to be iid. This eliminates the need to
track an additional state variable for each shock when solving the bargaining problem.
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the same form
Gt =
Z 1
0
Gt(j)
 1
 dj
 
 1
The elasticity of substitution between varieties, , is larger than 1. The budget
constraint at time t is given byZ 1
0
Pt(j)Ct(j)dj + Et (Qt;t+1Dt+1) = t +Dt +WtNt(1   t)  Tt
where Pt(j) is the price of variety j, Dt+1 is the nominal payo¤ of the portfolio
held at the end of period t, t is the representative households share of prots
in the imperfectly competitive rms, Wt are wages,  t is an wage income tax
rate and Tt are lump sum taxes. Qt;t+1 is the stochastic discount factor for one
period ahead payo¤s.
Households must rst decide how to allocate a given level of expenditure
across the various goods that are available. They do so by adjusting the share
of a particular good in their consumption bundle to exploit any relative price dif-
ferences - this minimizes the costs of consumption. Optimization of expenditure
for any individual good implies the demand function,
Ct(j) =

Pt(j)
Pt
 
Ct
where we have price indices given by
Pt =
Z 1
0
Pt(j)
1 dj
 1
1 
The budget constraint can therefore be rewritten as
PtCt + Et (Qt;t+1Dt+1) = t +Dt +WtNt(1   t)  Tt (3)
where
R 1
0
Pt(j)Ct(j)dj = PtCt.
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2.1.1 HouseholdsProblems
The rst of the householdsintertemporal problems involves allocating consump-
tion expenditure across time. For tractability assume that (1) takes the specic
form
E0
1X
t=0
t
 
C1 t 
 
t
1   + 
G1 t 
 
t
1    
Nt
1+' t 
N
t
1 + '
!
(4)
We can then maximize utility subject to the budget constraint (3) to obtain
the optimal allocation of consumption across time,


Ct
Ct+1
 
t
t+1
 
Pt
Pt+1

= Qt;t+1
Taking conditional expectations on both sides and rearranging gives
RtEt

Ct
Ct+1
 
t
t+1
 
Pt
Pt+1

= 1 (5)
where Rt = 1EtfQt;t+1g is the gross return on a riskless one period bond paying
o¤ a unit of currency in t+ 1. This is the familiar consumption Euler equation
which implies that consumers are attempting to smooth consumption over time
such that the marginal utility of consumption is equal across periods (after
allowing for tilting due to interest rates di¤ering from the householdsrate of
time preference). Household optimization implies a transversality condition that
combined with the no-Ponzi condition yields
lim
T!1
EtQt;TDT = 0
A log-linearized version of (5) can be written as
bCt + bt = Et  bCt+1 + bt+1  1 (rt   Et (t+1)) (6)
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where hatted variables denote percentage deviations from steady-state, rt =
Rt    where  = 1   1, and t = pt   pt 1 is price ination.
The householdsproblem is to determine the optimal labor supply. The FOC
for the labor supply decision is given by,
(1   t)wt = N't Ct Nt
where the real wage is dened as, wt  WtPt . Log-linearizing implies,
  
1   b t + bwt = ' bNt +  bCt + bNt
where  indicates the steady-state value of tax rate. Generally, an overbar
indicates the steady-state value of a variable.
2.2 Allocation of Government Spending
The allocation of government spending across goods is determined by minimizing
total costs,
R 1
0
Pt(j)Gt(j)dj. Given the form of the basket of public goods this
implies,
Gt(j) =

Pt(j)
Pt
 
Gt
2.3 Firms
The production function is linear, so for rm j
Yt(j) = AtNt(j) (7)
where at = ln(At) is time varying and stochastic. While the demand curve they
face is given by,
Yt(j) =

Pt(j)
Pt
 
Yt
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where Yt =
hR 1
0
Yt(j)
 1
 dj
i 
 1
. The objective function of the rm is given by,
1X
s=0
(p)
sQt;t+s

Pt(j)
P
t+s
Y (j)t+s   Wt+s
Pt+s
Y (j)t+s(1  {)
At

(8)
where p is the probability that the rm is unable to change its price in a
particular period, { is an employment subsidy which can be used to eliminate
the steady-state distortion associated with monopolistic competition and dis-
tortionary income taxes. Prot maximization then implies that rms that are
able to change price in period t will select the following price,
P t =
P1
s=0(p)
sQt;t+s

Wt+sPt+s P

t+s
Yt+s
At+s

P1
s=0(p)
sQt;t+s

(  1)P 1t+sP t+sYt+s(1  {)

Leith and Wren-Lewis (2013) show that log-linearization of this pricing behavior
implies a New Keynesian Phillips curve for price ination which is given by,
t = Ett+1 + (cmct + bt)
where  = (1 p)(1 p)p , cmct =  at + bwt indicates the real log-linearized mar-
ginal cost of production at t, and we introduce a mark-up shock, bt, representing
the temporary deviation of the desired markup from its steady-state value.
2.4 Equilibrium
Goods market clearing requires, for each good j,
Yt(j) = Ct(j) +Gt(j) (9)
which allows us to write,
Yt = Ct +Gt
15
2.5 Government Budget Constraint
Noting the equivalence between factor incomes and national output,
PtYt =WtNt +t   {WtNt
and the denition of aggregate demand, we can map the consumers ow budget
constraint, (3), to that of the government as,
Tt +WtNt( t   {) +Qt;t+1Dt+1 = Dt + PtGt (10)
where the net value of the householdsportfolio at time t is Dt = Rt 1Bt 1 and
where Bt 1 is the stock of government bonds at the end of period t-1 and Rt 1
is the risk free nominal interest rate.
As discussed above, in order to focus on the time-inconsistency problem as-
sociated with the introduction of debt and distortionary taxation to the New
Keynesian model we follow Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) and later authors
and introduce a steady-state subsidy. This subsidy ensures the steady-state
is e¢ cient by eliminating the distortions caused by distortionary taxation and
imperfect competition in price setting, and thereby removes the usual desire
on the part of policy makers to raise output above its natural level to com-
pensate for these distortions. It is nanced by lump-sum taxation. We shall
assume that both the level of the subsidy and the associated level of lump-sum
taxation cannot be altered from this steady state level, so that any changes
in the governments budget constraint have to be nanced by changes in dis-
tortionary taxation, government spending or debt service costs.10 This implies
10 If we considered the lump-sum nanced subsidy to be a policy instrument, which could
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that WtNt{ = Tt in our economy at all points in time, allowing us to simplify
the budget constraint to,
WtNt t +Bt = Rt 1Bt 1 + PtGt (11)
Dening real debt as, bt 1  Bt 1Rt 1Pt 1 this can be written in real terms as,
wtNt t +
bt
Rt
=
bt 1
t
+Gt (12)
and its steady state by,
b =
wN  G
1  
We can log-linearize the governments ow budget constraint around this steady
state, and replacing the interest rate with the consumption Euler equation, (6),
yields,
bbt 1   t =  hbbt   Et t+1 + ( bCt+1 + bt+1)i (13)
+
 bCt + bt+ wN
b
 bwt + bNt + b t
 G
b
bGt
Appendix 1(1) denes the steady-state ratios contained in this log-linearization
as a function of model parameters and the steady-state debt-GDP ratio.
3 Policy Objectives
In order to derive a welfare function for policy analysis, we proceed in the
following manner. Firstly, we consider the social planners problem. In steady-
be varied over time, then there would be no trade-o¤ between scal solvency and business
cycle stabilization and the policy problem would be rendered trivial.
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state, we then contrast this with the outcome under exible prices in order to
determine the level of the steady-state subsidy required to ensure the models
steady-state is e¢ cient. Finally, we construct a quadratic approximation to
utility in our sticky-price/distortionary tax economy which assesses the extent
to which endogenous variables di¤er from the e¢ cient equilibrium due to the
nominal inertia, tax distortions and bargaining over policy present in the model.
We then recast our model in terms of the gapvariables contained within our
welfare metric. Finally, we describe and motivate how the two policy makers
objective functions di¤er from the social optimum.
3.1 The Social Planners Problem
The social planner is not constrained by the price mechanism and simply max-
imizes the representative households utility, (4), subject to the technology, (7),
and resource constraints, (9). This yields the following rst order conditions,
(Ct )
  =  (Gt )
 
(Ct )
    Y 't A (1+')t Nt = 0
where we introduce the *superscript to denote the e¢ cient level of that vari-
able. These can be log-linearized around the e¢ cient steady-state, and given
the national accounting identity we obtain,
bY t =  1 + ' + '

at   1
 + '
bNt
and,
bY t = bCt = bGt
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3.2 Social Welfare
Appendix 1(1) derives the subsidy, {, required for the steady-state of the
exible-price equilibrium to be e¢ cient. Given this subsidy, if the government
implements its spending plans in line with the social planners problem in steady-
state then the ex price steady-state is the same as the e¢ cient output level.
Appendix 1(1) also denes the steady-state ratios contained in the log-linearized
budget constraint, (13), as a function of model parameters and the steady-state
debt-GDP ratio.
Appendix 1(2) derives the quadratic approximation to utility as
  =  N1+' 1
2
E0
1X
t=0
t

( bCt   bCt )2 + (1  )( bGt   bGt )2+
'(bYt   bY t )2 +  2t

+ tip+O[2]
where tip captures terms which are independent of policy and O[2] terms which
are higher than second order. It contains quadratic terms in price ination
reecting the costs of price dispersion induced by ination in the presence of
nominal inertia, as well as terms in the consumption, government spending and
output gaps (i.e. the di¤erence between the actual value of the variable and its
optimal value). The weights attached to each element are a function of deep
model parameters.
3.3 Gap variables
We have derived welfare based on various gaps, so we now proceed to rewrite our
model in terms of the same gap variables to facilitate derivation of bargained
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policy outcomes. The consumption Euler equation can be written in gap form
as,
( bCt   bCt ) = Et  bCt+1   bCt+1  1 [(rt   rt )  Et (t+1)]
where rt = 
1+'
+' [Et (at+1)  at] + 
h
Et
bt+1  bti  +' hEt bNt+1  bNt i
is the natural/e¢ cient rate of interest.
The New Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC) can be written in gap form as,
t = Ett+1 + 

'(bYt   bY t ) + ( bCt   bCt ) + 1   (b t   bt )

(14)
where, following Benigno and Woodford (2003) we dene, 1  bt = bt. In other
words, we are dening our e¢ cienttax rate as the tax rate required to perfectly
o¤set the impact of a cost-push shock.11 If we had access to a lump-sum tax
to nance the budget decit then this would be the optimal tax rate. However,
given the need to nance the government liabilities through distortionary tax-
ation, actual tax rates are likely to deviate from the level required to perfectly
o¤set such shocks. Appendix 1(3) rewrites the budget constraint in gap form
as,
bbt 1   t = bbt   Et ht+1 + ( bCt+1   bCt+1)i+
pst   ft + ( bCt   bCt ) (15)
11 It should be noted that we could dene the tax gapas being the actual tax rate relative
to any benchmark tax rate we choose, such as, for example, the initial steady-state tax rate.
However, it is convenient to dene the gap relative to the tax rate which o¤sets the impact of
a cost-push shock on ination.
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with the primary surplus dened as,
pst =
wN
b

(1 + ')(bYt   bY t ) + 11   (b t   bt ) + ( bCt   bCt )

  G
b
 bGt   bGt
(16)
and
ft =   [ + (1  )(1  )]
 
(1 + ')
 + '
at  
bNt
 + '
!
  wN
b
bt   (1  )bt
which captures the extent to which the various shocks hitting our model have
scal consequences. This is not a new shock, but is where all the shocks of
the model appear once the model has been re-written in gap form. The reason
why the shocks can be located only in the budget constraint is that it would
be possible, given the instruments available to the policy makers, to o¤set the
welfare costs of nominal inertia in the face of shocks and implement the social
planners allocation, if it was not necessary to also satisfy the governments
intertemporal budget constraint. Therefore, shocks matter in this model, only
to the extent that they have scal consequences. In light of this, we simplify
the analysis by assuming that government debt is the only state variable in the
model and focus on bargaining over how to deal with the debt disequilibrium
that has emerged as a result of those shocks.
3.4 Policy MakersPreferences
Policy maker preferences take the same basic form as our measure of social
welfare but with a crucial di¤erence, player i can potentially place di¤erent
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weights on the elements of social welfare,
 i =  N1+' 1
2
E0
1X
t=0
tl(xci ; x
g
i ; x
y
i ; x

i ) + tipi +O[2] (17)
with
l(xci ; x
g
i ; x
y
i ; x

i ) = x
c
i
 bCt   bCt 2 + (1  )xgi  bGt   bGt2+
'xyi
bYt   bY t 2 + xi  2t
When xzi 6= 1, for any z = c; g; y;  and i = 1; 2 then policy maker preferences
deviate from social welfare and if xz1 6= xz2 then there is scope for conict when
bargaining over policy. In the numerical section below, we shall highlight conict
over the importance given to ination in the two playersobjective functions, as
well as conict over the importance of uctuations of specic policy instruments.
However, the bargaining game considered below allows for conict across the
multiple elements of social welfare. We could have focused on a particular
micro-foundation for such conict, such as, for example, parties reecting the
preferences of two groups of households with di¤erent attitudes to the size of
the state, but that would have necessarily limited the generality of the results.
Instead, in line with our broad interpretation of the kinds of conict that can
drive negotiated outcomes, we prefer to allow for a wide range of di¤erences in
policy maker preferences.
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4 The Determination of Policy
4.1 The Model in Matrix Form
In this subsection, we rewrite the model in a recursive form suitable for dening
the constraints in the bargaining game implied by our description of the econ-
omy. Having already recast the model in terms of the gap variables contained in
the welfare function, we proceed by forming a guessof the relationship between
expectations and the state variable to eliminate expectations from the structural
equations. The coe¢ cients of these guesses will then be determined as part of
the xed-point solution to the bargaining game. In gap form, the instruments
proposed by player i are cgit = bCt   bCt ; ggit = bGt   bGt and git = b t   bt .12
In a linear-quadratic problem (without bargaining) the only equilibrium
strategies, if they exist, are linear. Since we focus on bargaining strategies
which are also linear, it must be that the forecasts on ination and the control
at time t are linear functions of the future debt bbt = St,
Ett+1 = f
iSt (18)
Etc
g
t+1 = c
iSt (19)
where f i and ci, with i = 1; 2; are coe¢ cients to be determined.13 The su-
12The monetary policy instrument is actually the short-term interest rate. However, the
monetary authorities e¤ectively have control over consumption through the consumption Euler
equation. Therefore we treat consumption as being their de facto policy instrument. Note
that by substituting the consumption Euler equation into the governments budget constraint
the debt service costs of varying interest rates are fully accounted for.
13We employ a rational-expectation framework, where economic agents have full information
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perscript i indicates the identity of the policy maker who made the policy mix
uit at t. Hence, we allow playersexpectation coe¢ cients to (potentially) di¤er
depending on which policy (player 1 or 2s) is implemented at t, given the state
St 1. In equilibrium, we will show that players will have the same forecast
coe¢ cients, f1 = f2 and c1 = c2, independently of who implemented the last
successful policy mix (this is fully captured in the forecasts by the future state
St):
14
Using these guessesfor consumption and ination expectations implies that
the budget constraint, (15), can be written as follows:
B0iSt = St 1 +B2uit (20)
with
St 1 =
 bbt 1  (21)
uit =
26666664
cgit
git
ggit
37777775 (22)
B0i =

(1  ci)

B2 =

B21;1 B21;2 B21;3

on the structure of the game, including playerspreferences, and anticipate the state-dependent
outcome of the game when forming their expectations.
14 In equilibrium, policies are implemented without delay and the focus is on bargaining
frictions which disappear, see (40) - (41) and Appendix 2.
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where
B21;1 =
 (' + )((1 + )B
Y
+ 1  )  (1  )  (1  )B
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Y
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( (2  )  (1   + )B
Y
)((1  )B
Y
+ (1  ))
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Y
B21;3 =
((1 + ')(   (1  )B
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)  '(1 + B
Y
))(1  )
B
Y
Then, if players implement party is proposed policy uit at t, the state St
becomes,
St = D1
iSt 1 +D2iuit (23)
with
D1i= [B0
i
] 1
D2i= [B0
i
]
 1
B2
while the NKPC, (14), in matrix form is given by,
Ett+1 = A1t +A2uit (24)
where
A1 =

1


A2 =

 ('+)  
((1 )B
Y
+(1 ))
  '(1 )

The latter, together with the ination forecast, (18), implies that ination can
be written as:
t = C1
iSt 1 +C2iuit (25)
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where
C1i = [A1]
 1
[f iD1i]
C2i = [A1]
 1
[f iD2i  A2]
Therefore, equation (23) describes the evolution of the state, government
debt, while (25) denes the ination outcome, both given the inherited state
and conditional on the policy mix proposed by player i being implemented.
These equations will act as constraints on the bargaining game outlined below.
We can similarly dene the playersper-period objective function in matrix
form, for player i, as,
li(x
c
i ; x
g
i ; x
y
i ; x

i ) = tR
it + u
0
itQ
iuit (26)
and for player j as
lj(x
c
i ; x
g
i ; x
y
i ; x

i ) = tR
jt + u
0
itQ
juit (27)
where uit is in (22), Ri = xi
h


i
and
Qi =
26666664
(xci + 'x
y
i ) 0 2(1  )'xyi
0 0 0
0 0 (1  )(xgi + 'xyi (1  ))
37777775 (28)
with i; j = 1; 2 and i 6= j.15
15Our solution allows for preferences to di¤er across all elements of welfare. However, in the
numerical section, we focus on the e¤ects of players attaching di¤erent weights to individual
elements of social welfare.
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4.2 The Bargaining Game
In this subsection, we describe the structure of the bargaining game, before
solving this problem in the next subsection. For any state St 1, there is a
bargaining stage where players negotiate the policy mix, following a standard
alternating-o¤er bargaining procedure (Rubinstein (1982)) with the crucial nov-
elty that any agreement reached in a bargaining stage a¤ects future bargaining
possibilities (via the state variable, St, in this case government debt, bbt 1, see
(21)). We assume that the rst player to make a proposal is randomly chosen.
Let qi be the constant (and unconditional) probability that player i is chosen to
make the rst proposal in a bargaining stage, with i = 1; 2 and q1+ q2 = 1: The
rst mover, say player i, makes a proposal over the values of the set of policy
instruments, uit, to player j (i; j = 1; 2 and i 6= j), which can be either accepted
or rejected.
In case of an acceptance, the bargaining stage ends and the agreement (or
policy) is implemented. The utility players obtain in this bargaining stage is as
in (26) and (27) , replicated below.
li(x
c
i ; x
g
i ; x
y
i ; x

i ) = tR
it + u
0
itQ
iuit
lj(x
c
i ; x
g
i ; x
y
i ; x

i ) = tR
jt + u
0
itQ
juit
The policy uit will a¤ect the state variable for the next period (a quarter of a
year in our numerical calibration), via (23). In the new period, with state St,
another bargaining stage will take place where players will attempt to nd a
new agreement.
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In case of a rejection, instead, the state remains unchanged and after a
short interval of time, player j can make a counter-o¤er, ujt which again can
either be accepted or rejected. Disutility per-bargaining round in disagreement
is X(1   ) < 0, with i; j = 1; 2. In our model, there are two discount factors,
 and , to capture the di¤erent intervals of time. The rst, , reects the
usual discounting of time in our New Keynesian model and is applied between
bargaining stages (as shown in (1)). The second, , captures the impatience
of the players across bargaining rounds within a bargaining stage. As shown
in Muthoo (1999, p. 303) in the context of repeated bargaining games, the
restriction of  >  is not only more realistic (it is quicker to make a countero¤er
than starting a new bargaining stage), but also supports more economically
interesting solutions where players makes concessions rather than implementing
extreme (take-it-or-leave-it) o¤ers. In our model, we will consider the limit
where bargaining frictions tend to disappear (i.e.,  ! 1). As a result, parties
have the opportunity to almost instantly make a countero¤er after any rejection
within the bargaining stage (and who is chosen to make the initial proposal
becomes immaterial).16
The focus is on stationary Markov Perfect Equilibria (MPE), that is a Nash
equilibrium with stationary Markov strategies in each subgame. With stationary
16We solve the bargaining problem following a non-cooperative approach. While both co-
operative and non-cooperative approaches can give the same solution for the case of a single
surplus, when a countero¤er can be made after an innitesimally short interval of time (Bin-
more (1987)), in dynamic bargaining (with many agreements still to be achieved), a similar
mapping between the two approaches has not yet been established.
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Markov strategies, the only relevant variable a¤ecting playersbehavior is the
state variable, government debt, bbt 1. The stationary strategies specify the same
action for the same value of the state, independently of time. In our framework,
a strategy consists in pair of functions: a proposal (on the policy mix) and a
response strategy.
In an arbitrary (stationary) MPE, let V i(St 1) (W i(St 1); respectively) be
the optimal discounted payo¤ of player i when i proposes uit (responds) at t
and the state variable is St 1; i = 1; 2. These must be the optimal payo¤s,
given that an o¤er can be either accepted or rejected:
V i(St 1) = maxfV i0(St 1); X(1  ) + W i(St 1)g (29)
W j(St 1) = maxfW j0(St 1); X(1  ) + V j(St 1)g (30)
where V i0(St 1) and W j0(St 1) are the sum of discounted payo¤s in the case
of an acceptance, while the second terms in brackets in (29) and (30) represent
the payo¤s when there is a rejection. For the latter, the payo¤s to the proposer,
in the event of rejection, are made up of the (per-bargaining-round) disutility
of disagreement, X(1   ), and the (discounted) expected payo¤s from being
a responder in the next bargaining round, W i(St 1). While the payo¤s to a
responder who rejects the proposal are the (per-bargaining-round) disutility of
disagreement, X(1  ), and the expected payo¤s from being a proposer in the
next bargaining round, V j(St 1). Hence, following a standard alternating-o¤er
procedure, in the event of a rejection, the players switch roles (the player who
rejected the proposal now can make a counter-o¤er). The payo¤s in case of an
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acceptance, V i0(St 1) and W j0(St 1), have recursive structures:
V i0(St 1) = A min
uit
 
b(tR
it + u
0
itQ
iuit)  EtCi(St)

(31)
W j0(St 1) = A  b(tRjt + u0itQjuit) + EtCj(St)) (32)
where A is the constant term from the Taylor approximation to utility, b =
1
2N
1+'
and EtCi(St) (EtCj(St) respectively) indicates the expected value of
the game continuation to i (j, respectively) at t:17 This can be written as
a weighted sum of the expected payo¤s to a proposer and a responder, with
weights given by the probabilities of being a proposer and a responder:
EtC
i(St) = q
iV i(St) + (1  qi)W i(St) (33)
An o¤er uit will be accepted if the so-called acceptance condition holds:
W j0(St 1)  X(1  ) + V j(St 1) (34)
This states that player j accepts uit, given St 1; if his discounted payo¤ as a
responder, W j(St 1), is not smaller than the discounted payo¤ he would get by
rejecting uit and making a countero¤er in the next period, V j(St 1).
If condition (34) does not hold, the policy uit is rejected, the state is assumed
to be unchanged and the roles of the proposer and the responder are swapped;
using (29) and (30), then
V i(St 1) = X(1 )+W i(St 1) and W j(St 1) = X(1 )+V j(St 1) (35)
17The expectation is conditional on i being the proposer at time t: However, this is omitted
in the notation since is captured by St, see (23).
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It is intuitive that in equilibrium delays cannot be protable, if the state remains
unchanged and the per-bargaining round disutility of disagreement is su¢ ciently
large.18 Parties can always invest in future bargaining possibilities so as to avoid
costly delays.19 ;20 This implies that in equilibrium,
uit(St 1) 2 argmaxA 
 
b(tR
it + u
0
itQ
iuit)  EtCi(St)

s.t., W j(St 1)  X(1  ) + V j(St 1)
given the equation of motion (23) for St,
St = D1
iSt 1 +D2iuit
t, which evolves according to (25):
t = C1
iSt 1 +C2iuit
and the expectations of t+1 and c
g
t+1, as in (18) and (19). This problem
consists of a system of constrained recursive optimizations, with an extra layer
of complexity: the constraints, that is, the acceptance conditions (34), embody
18This can be shown formally following arguments similar to the ones presented in Muthoo
(1995) for the case of repeated games.
19 In our framework, delays could be protable if debt decreases while parties are haggling
- we rule out this case. In other bargaining frameworks, strategic delays can be sustained in
equilibrium when uncertainty can be partially solved by waiting (e.g., see Admati and Perry
(1987)) or in complete information games when one party bargain with two or more other
parties (e.g., see Cai (2000)).
20There are macroeconomic models (without bargaining) where delays are rational. For
instance, Orphanides (1996) shows that, in a stochastic environment, a government facing
high ination should delay its stabilization programme for more favorable external conditions.
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both another recursive problem (via V j(St 1)) and the expectations (18) and
(19).
4.3 MPE Policies
In this section, we nd the optimal policies using the guess and verify method
(and a xed-point argument).
Since the focus is on linear time-invariant equilibrium strategies, the value
function for player i; V i(St 1); and his optimal discounted payo¤as a responder,
W i(St 1); must be quadratic:
V i(St 1) = A  bS0t 1iSt 1 (36)
W i(St 1) = A  bS0t 1iSt 1 (37)
where i and i; with i = 1; 2 are coe¢ cients to be determined (or guesses).21
When players dene their strategies, they have to consider the value of the con-
tinuation game, EtCi(St). Given (33), this is a linear combination of quadratic
functions, hence, EtCi(St) must be also a quadratic function of the state St :
EtC
i(St) = A  bStiSt (38)
where i = qii + (1  qi)i; with i = 1; 2:
Let X11 indicate the rst element of matrix/vector X. Then the MPE
solution is derived in the following proposition.
21There is no linear term in (36) and (37), because the second order approximation to utility
contains only second order terms, due to the assumed e¢ ciency of the steady-state and the
policy-makerspreferences are assumed to take the same form.
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Proposition 1 For  ! 1; the MPE policies are given by
uit = O1
iSt 1 (39)
with
j = j
where the payo¤ coe¢ cients are
i = P0i
0
RiP0i +O1i
0
QiO1i + G1i
0
iG1i
j = P0i
0
RjP0i +O1i
0
QjO1i + G1i
0
jG1i
with i = qii + (1  qi)i; the forecast coe¢ cients are
f1 = f2 = qiP0i + (1  qi)P0j (40)
c1 = c2 = qiO1i11 + (1  qi)O1j11 (41)
and O1i;G1i; and P0i are dened in (68),(70) and (72), with i; j = 1; 2; and
i 6= j:
Proof. See Appendix 2.
It is worth to highlight some features of the solution. First, generally the
expectations on t+1 and c
g
t+1 are time-invariant linear functions of the state,
St, as shown in (40) and (41). Since frictions disappear and there are no delays
in equilibrium, the expectation coe¢ cients remain invariant (f1 = f2 and c1 =
c2). Second, given the focus on frictionless bargaining ( ! 1), for a given
state, St 1, players receive the same payo¤s when making an o¤er or responding
(j ! j). Finally, as shown in the appendix, generally for  < 1; there may
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not be time-invariant linear policies in equilibrium or players may not make
any concession in equilibrium. However, in the most realistic case in which the
frictions in the bargaining stage disappear ( ! 1), players implement time-
invariant policies and make concessions. This is the richest solution in terms of
the interplay of forces in the game, and it is analyzed in the next section.
5 Numerical Examples
In this section, we outline the response of the model to a series of shocks which
have had scal consequences, and illustrate the proposition established above.
Employing the econometric estimates in Leith and Malley (2005) we adopt the
following parameter set, ' = 1,  = 2;  = 1:2,  = 6,  = 0:99, and, following
Gali (1994) the share of government consumption in GDP, 1    = 0:25. In
our benchmark simulations we assume a degree of price stickiness of p = 0:75,
which implies that an average contract length of one year, and an debt-GDP
ratio of 60%. We also focus on the most interesting case in which a bargaining
round is innitesimally short ( ! 1), hence counter-o¤er can be made quickly
after a rejection.22
Conict over Ination Conservatism
Although our bargaining game is consistent with conict over any element(s)
22As a result, the value of the per-bargaining-round disagreement, (1  )X, does not play
a direct role in the numerical solutions, since it will satisfy the acceptance condition (78) for
any X < 0 when  ! 1:
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of social welfare, in this section we begin by focusing on an example where there
is only conict over the relative weight given to ination. Specically, we set
the weights on all elements of welfare, other than ination, equal to that which
would be chosen by a benevolent policy maker (xzi = 1 for z = c; y; g and
i = 1; 2), while for ination we consider an equal but opposite deviation from
social welfare weights in evaluating the costs of ination, xi = (1 + x) and
xj = (1  x) with i; j = 1; 2 and i 6= j. That is, player i is more concerned with
stabilizing ination following shocks than player j and their objective functions
reduce to,
 i =  N1+' 1
2
E0
1X
t=0
tl(1; 1; 1; 1 + x) + tipi +O[2] (42)
with
l(1; 1; 1; 1+x) = 
 bCt   bCt 2+(1 ) bGt   bGt2+'bYt   bY t 2+(1+x)  2t
and,
 j =  N1+' 1
2
E0
1X
t=0
tl(1; 1; 1; 1  x) + tipj +O[2] (43)
with
l(1; 1; 1; 1 x) = 
 bCt   bCt 2+(1 ) bGt   bGt2+'bYt   bY t 2+(1 x)  2t
respectively. Therefore, as we increase x we increase the weight given to in-
ation stabilization by player i, while reducing it, proportionately, for player
j. One way of motivating such a set up would be to allow the elasticity of
demand for monopolistic rmsproducts to be of one of two types - high or
low. Party i represents the interests of those workers employed by high elastic-
ity rms, while party j represents the workers employed by the correspondingly
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lower elasticity rms. Alternatively, the conict could between a central bank
and the government where they do not share the same degree of ination con-
servatism, but where they still agree a common set of macroeconomic policies
before implementing their respective policy instruments.23
As shown in the proof of proposition 1, the solution to the model will take
the form,
uit =
26666664
cgit
git
ggit
37777775 = O1
iSt 1 (44)
t = PO
iSt 1 (45)
St = G1
iSt 1 (46)
see (67)-(72) in Appendix 2. Since debt is the only state variable in our model,
these solution matrices will relate the solution of the endogenous variables in
our model to the degree of debt disequilibrium.
{Insert Figure 1 around here}
Figure 1 plots these solution coe¢ cients as a function of x, the degree to
which policy makers disagree over the importance of ination, for three alter-
native steady-state debt-GDP ratios (20%, 50% and 80% indicated as L, M and
H, respectively). The point of intersection with the y-axis describes the model
23 In Section 6, we consider the case of an independent central bank which does not bargain
over policy with a scal authority, but nevertheless sets policy taking account of the setting
of scal policy.
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solution in the absence of any conict, x = 0. It, therefore, corresponds to
the usual case of monetary and scal policies being conducted by a benevo-
lent policy maker without the need for any bargaining - this case is considered
in Leith and Wren-Lewis(2013). It is helpful to describe the policy outcomes
this implies to serve as a benchmark against which to compare solutions which
introduce conict and bargaining to the policy process. The standard policy
problem implies that a shock which raises debt will result in the policy maker
cutting government consumption. The remainder of the policy mix depends,
crucially, on the level of debt since this a¤ects the relative e¢ cacy of alternative
policy instruments. At lower debt levels spending cuts are accompanied by tax
rises and a tightening of monetary policy to moderate ination. At higher debt
levels monetary policy becomes a far more e¤ective means of stabilizing debt,
and interest rates are cut to boost the tax base and reduce debt service costs.
In this case, tax rates may actually fall to mitigate the rise in ination caused
by the relaxation of monetary policy.
In the absence of conict/bargaining, higher debt levels can actually lead
to the policy maker overcorrecting by reducing debt below steady-state in the
period after a shock raises debt. Leith and Wren-Lewis (2013) discuss this
desire to over-correct debt in a model without political conict. It arises under
a time-consistent policy as manipulating endogenous state variables is the only
way a policy maker can inuence expectations. Since, in equilibrium, ination is
rising in debt levels, a fall in debt relative to steady-state gives rise to a deation.
Given the forward-looking NKPC the expectation that debt will be driven below
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steady-state in the future, reduces inationary expectations, improving policy
trade-o¤s for the policy maker today.
Introducing conict/bargaining shows that, as the degree of ination aver-
sion diverges across policy makers, the absolute value of the debt coe¢ cient
falls. This implies that the level of debt is stabilized faster following the shock,
but with less of the overshooting seen under medium to high debt levels in the
absence of conict/bargaining. Moreover, the policy function relating ination
to debt has a higher coe¢ cient across all three debt levels (L, M and H) as the
extent of conict rises. In other words, in this case, conict over ination results
in higher ination, but with less attempt to inuence inationary expectations
by reducing debt further than is necessary. These e¤ects arise from the nature
of the political conict we have introduced.
The player with the lower weight attached to ination is now more content
to utilize surprise ination to stabilize debt, and less concerned about mitigat-
ing its e¤ects by over-stabilizing debt in the short-run. Accordingly, such a
player may seek to propose policies which reduce the size of other welfare rele-
vant gaps, namely consumption and government spending. Indeed this is what
we see. In the policy agreed under political conict the policy makers stabilize
private and public consumption gaps to a greater extent (which benets both
players equally, cet. par.) and rely on movements in taxation (which have no di-
rect welfare consequences) to a greater extent. In other words, the less ination
averse player achieves the agreed increased use of ination as a public debt sta-
bilization instrument, by using government spending and reduced debt service
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costs (through an accommodative monetary policy) less, and tax policy more.
It is important to note that the policies implemented are the same regardless
of whom the initial proposer is in any bargaining round since we have assumed
the period of time between bargaining rounds is innitesimally small so that
in equilibrium, after making the appropriate concessions, players are indi¤erent
between being a proposer or a responder.
In order to make the intuition for this clearer, Figure 2 plots the impulse
response functions (IRFs) for each of these variables for a shock which raises
debt disequilibrium by 10% with an assumed debt-GDP ratio of 20%, while
Figure 3 replicates the same experiment with a debt-GDP ratio of 80%. There
are two lines within each sub-plot: the red solid line for the case without con-
ict/bargaining, and a blue dashed line for the policy outcomes with bargain-
ing and a degree of conict over ination given by x = 0:2: Without con-
ict/bargaining, when steady-state debt levels are relatively low (Figure 2),
higher debt results in cuts in government spending and increases in taxation,
which raise ination, but with an o¤setting tightening of monetary policy which
reduces private consumption. Debt is adjusted gradually, primarily through
spending cuts and tax increases. With conict, the speed of debt stabilization
is increased, tax rates are increased, monetary policy is not tightened as ag-
gressively (consumption generally falls by less) and ination jumps by more.
Government spending is also generally not reduced by as much. The initial
jump in ination, tax increases and moderation in the monetary tightening has
successfully reduced debt more aggressively so that disequilibrium in all welfare
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relevant variables is less from period 2 onwards.
{Insert Figures 2 and 3 around here}
Figure 3 plots the same IRFs with and without conict but for a signi-
cantly higher steady-state debt-GDP ratio of 80%. In this case, the relaxation
in monetary policy and surprise ination it induces are the primary tools for
stabilizing debt, with tax cuts to help stabilize ination given the substantial
monetary accommodation. In the face of political negotiations the party with
less ination aversion proposes milder spending cuts and less monetary accom-
modation to obtain the approval of the ination averse party who dislikes the
higher ination that emerges. As a result, the main di¤erence in the policy
mix, relative to the policy implemented in the absence of conict, is that the
anti-ination tax cuts are now substantially reduced.
Conict Over the Use of Monetary Policy
We now turn to the case of conict over private consumption, see Figure
4. Since uctuations in private consumption are primarily induced by changes
in real interest rates, this conict can be seen as a proxy for conict over the
use of monetary policy to stabilize government debt. Here the results vary
in important ways across di¤erent steady-state debt levels. In contrast to the
case where conict was over ination, at lower debt levels, debt stabilization is
slower rather than faster. Essentially, the policy makers agree to use all policy
instruments less in stabilizing debt, and this is welfare improving for both policy
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makers. In e¤ect, the time-inconsistency problem has been partially overcome
due to the conict over the use of an accommodative monetary policy and
both parties experience the welfare benets of a more gradual debt reduction.
At mid to high debt levels, the coe¢ cient on consumption remains lower in
the presence of conict/bargaining implying that monetary policy is not used
to the same extent in the face of such conict. However, as debt levels rise
the use of other instruments is heightened. At higher debt levels monetary
policy accommodation is one of the most e¤ective ways of stabilizing debt, by
introducing a conict over the use of that instrument there is little compensation
the player with the low aversion to monetary accommodation can o¤er to induce
the other player to agree to use monetary policy in that way.
Figures 5 and 6 provide IRFs at debt levels of 20% and 80% of GDP, re-
spectively. Here at low debt levels we see the speed of debt stabilization is
substantially reduced relative to the benchmark without conict/bargaining,
and the policy mix involves smaller government spending cuts, tax increases
and ination at the same time as a less anti-ination monetary policy (private
consumption falls by less). At higher debt levels (Figure 6) the need to stabilize
debt through other channels once the use of accommodative monetary policy
has been reduced implies that government spending is cut by more, taxes rise
rather than fall and the initial ination surprise is greater.
{insert Figures 4-6 around here}
Conict over Spending Cuts
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Our nal form of conict is over government spending (see Figure 7). In
this case we get a mixture of the trade-o¤s found under the other two forms of
conict. At low to medium debt levels, the player with the lower costs of using
spending cuts as the scal consolidation tool succeeds in implementing such a
policy by proposing a policy mix which reduces ination, primarily by moderat-
ing tax increases. This is su¢ cient to achieve consensus over the implemented
policy. However, at higher debt levels the ease of stabilizing debt through sur-
prise ination and monetary accommodation mean that it is no longer viable for
the player less averse to uctuations in government spending to obtain agree-
ment by making a proposal which reduces the reliance on such policies - the
resultant uctuations in government spending needed to stabilize debt are sim-
ply too costly for his opponent. Therefore, we move to a situation which is more
like conict over the degree of consumption stabilization - the player averse to
such uctuations dominates the bargaining and reduces their use.
{insert Figure 7 around here}
Figure 8 plots the paths for government spending under the bargained policy
as well as the benchmark of no conict/bargaining.24 When debt levels are low,
the bargained outcome implies larger spending cuts (larger than in the case of
24We do not report IRFs for all variables in this case as, for most variables, the di¤erences
due to this source of conict are relatively small. However, the major di¤erence is that
government spending cuts are higher (lower) than the non-conict benchmark at low (high)
debt levels, see Figure 7.
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no conict) in order to minimize the size of the consumption gap and reduce
equilibrium ination as a means of obtaining the agreement of the player more
adverse to uctuations in government spending. At higher steady-state debt lev-
els, the reduced use of government spending in achieving the scal consolidation
is in line with the preferences of the party averse to uctuations in government
spending, and since this instrument is not used heavily at higher debt levels,
even without bargaining, there is only a minor adjustment to all other policy
instruments when stabilizing debt.
{insert Figure 8 around here}
6 Extension I: A Conservative Central Bank
In this section, we extend our results by assuming that the political parties in-
teract with an independent central bank (CB), which controls the short-term
interest rate and may be more conservative than society, in the sense that
it places a greater weight on ination than found in the social welfare func-
tion, following the arguments in Rogo¤ (1985). It will be shown that outcomes
achieved through bargaining with an independent CB are quite di¤erent from
those which emerge when the interactions are strategic. This is due to the fact
that bargained outcomes require both parties to anticipate the costs of alter-
native policies for their opponent which is not the case in traditional models of
strategic interaction between policy makers.
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The objective functions for the two political parties remain the same in the
previous section. With focus on conict on government spending, these become:
 i =  N1+' 1
2
E0
1X
t=0
tl(1; 1 + x; 1; 1) + tipi +O[2] with
l(1; 1+x; 1; 1) = ( bCt  bCt )2+(1+x)(1 )( bGt  bGt )2+'(bYt  bY t )2+  2t
and,
 j =  N1+' 1
2
E0
1X
t=0
tl(1; 1  x; 1; 1) + tipj +O[2] with
l(1; 1 x; 1; 1) = ( bCt  bCt )2+(1 x)(1 )( bGt  bGt )2+'(bYt  bY t )2+  2t
However, their controls now reduce to,
uit =
2664 git
ggit
3775 (47)
and they take the CBs policies (as reected in cgt ) as given. Instead, the objec-
tive function for the CB is as follows:
 CB =  N1+' 1
2
E0
1X
t=0
tl(1; 1; 1; 1 + xCB) + tipi +O[2] with
l(1; 1; 1; 1+xCB) = ( bCt  bCt )2+(1 )( bGt  bGt )2+'(bYt bY t )2+(1+xCB)  2t
with the political partiespolicy instruments (47) taken as given. The following
proposition summarizes the equilibrium for this game.
Proposition 2 For  ! 1; the MPE policies are linear in the state St:
uit = O1
i
BSt 1 (48)
cgt = O1
i
CBSt 1 (49)
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with
j = j
where the payo¤ coe¢ cients are:
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the forecast coe¢ cients are
f = qiP0iCB + (1  qi)P0jCB (54)
c = qiO1iCB + (1  qi)O1jCB
and O1iB ;O1
i
CB ;P0
i
CB ;G1
i
CB are dened in (94)-(97) in Appendix 3, with
i; j = 1; 2; and i 6= j:
Proof. The proof follows an argument similar to the one for Proposition 1, see
Appendix 3.
We next show the implications of introducing an independent central bank
for the numerical analysis. Figure 9 considers the case of an independent central
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bank with varying degrees of ination aversion (xCB ; in percentage, is equal to
0; 25; 50%), setting monetary policy conditional on the bargained outcome of the
policy game between two scal authorities with di¤erent attitudes to the use
of government consumption as a policy instrument (x (in %) = 20%). As the
degree of ination conservatism rises, the central bank tightens monetary policy
for a given scal shock, leading to a larger fall in private consumption. This
moderates the initial jump in ination. Therefore, an independent central banks
ination conservatism reduces the level of ination associated with a given level
of debt. The fact that the inationary costs of debt are lower, for a given level of
debt, thanks to the credibility of the central bank, means that the scal players
have less incentive to reduce debt rapidly following a scal shock. As a result
their bargained scal policy mix implies a slower pace of scal correction and
less aggressive use of both taxes and government consumption as a result.
{Insert Figure 9 around here}
The outcomes in this case are quite di¤erent from those seen when policy
emerged as a result of bargaining between two players with di¤erent attitudes
to ination, see Figure 2. In the case of conict, the less ination averse player
was typically able to extract greater concessions from the other player due to
the e¢ cacy of using ination as a debt stabilization device, ceteris paribus. As
a result, greater ination conict tended to increase ination for a given debt
level, and raise the speed of scal correction. This reects the fact that under
bargaining policy outcomes are inuenced by the costs and benets experienced
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by each player as they seek an agreement. A truly independent central bank,
on the other hand, does not care how costly their policy choices are for the
government, except to the extent that it a¤ects their policy response, and as a
result ination is lower in the case of strategic interactions between the scal
authorities and the independent central bank.
7 Extension II - Non-Separable Utility
The benchmark model assumed that private and public consumption were sep-
arable in agents utility. This extension relaxes this assumption by following
DAuria (2015) in assuming that the private and public consumption can be
complements/substitutes. Specically, we assume that utility function is now
given by,
E0
1X
t=0
t
 eC1 t  t
1   + 
G1 t 
 
t
1    
N1+'t 
 
t 
N
t
1 + '
!
(55)
where eCt = Ct + Gt such that  < (>)0 implies private and public consump-
tion are complements (substitutes). Note that we need to retain the separable
element of government consumption in utility, G
1 
t 
 
t
1  , to ensure that the mar-
ginal utility of government consumption does not turn negative when private
and public consumption are complements,  < 0. We return to our benchmark
specication when  = 0.
The introduction of non-separable preferences implies the consumption Euler
equation is now dened in terms of this adjusted measure of consumption, eCt,
RtEt
" eCteCt+1
! 
t
t+1
 
Pt
Pt+1
#
= 1 (56)
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Similarly for the labor supply decision depends on the marginal utility of private
consumption adjusted for public consumption,
(1   t)wt = N't eCt Nt
While the goods market clearing condition remains,
Yt = Ct +Gt (57)
= eCt + (1  )Gt
Appendix 4 shows how this a¤ects the log-linearized economy, its steady-
state, and our second-order approximation to social welfare. In essence the
policy problem remains isomorphic to the benchmark model, but where the
consumption gap is now dened as cvt =
beCt   beCt and parameter 0 = eCY now
denes the share of adjusted consumption in GDP, such that G
Y
= 1 
0
1  . To
obtain the implied path for consumption we use the fact that, the loglinearized
denition of adjusted consumption is given by,
beCt = CeC bCt + GeC bGt
Since our steady-state is assumed to be e¢ cient, the steady-state ratios of pri-
vate and public consumption to adjusted consumption can be tied down to
obtain the log-linear relationship,
bCt =  1   
1  
 1

! 1 beCt     
1  
  1
  v
! 1 bGt
The values of  in the literature cover both cases of substitutes (see, for example,
Aschauer (1985) who obtains estimates ranging from 0.23 to 0.42 for the US)
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and complements (Karras (1994) estimates that the  < 0 for a majority of the
30 OECD economies he considers. Similarly, Leeper et al. (2017) considers a
range of estimates lying between -1.58 and +1.58). Figure 10 adopts values for
 of 0:23. Since government consumption is chosen optimally in our model,
rather than considered to be an exogenous process, we adjust the parameter 
when varying  in order to ensure the steady-state G/Y ratio remains at its
calibrated value of 0.25.25
The impact of this when conict is over government consumption (at 20%)
is shown in Figure 10. Given the level of debt, when  = 0 we obtain a pattern
of response like that described in Figure 5. The bargained policy outcome cuts
government consumption, tightens monetary policy (leading to a fall in private
consumption) and raises taxes to reduce the debt burden. Introducing com-
plementarity between public and private consumption,  =  0:23, means that
the cut in government consumption reduces the marginal utility of consump-
tion, cet. par., encouraging households to reduce private consumption. In order
to mitigate this e¤ect, bargained policy moderates the fall in public consump-
tion. The bargained policy also reduces the increase in taxation. This slows,
signicantly, the pace of debt reduction.
{Insert Figure 10 around here}
The opposite case of substitutability between private and public consump-
tion,  > 0, means that the fall in public consumption actually raises the mar-
25This implies that  = (1  )

G
Y
 1   (1  )  .
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ginal utility of private consumption encouraging the players to agree to relax
monetary policy and raise private consumption. In combination with a sig-
nicant increase in taxation, this stabilizes debt more quickly relative to the
benchmark and case of complementarity between private and public consump-
tion.
8 Conclusions
In this paper we examined the e¤ects of bargaining over policy choices between
di¤erent policy makers in a New Keynesian DSGE model. Since the bargaining
takes place in the context of a New Keynesian model with one monetary and
two scal policy instruments, the process of reaching agreement can give rise to
a policy mix which di¤ers signicantly from that obtained when policy is im-
plemented by a single policy maker. Which policy maker was able to get closest
to their preferred policy mix depends crucially on which instrument/element of
social welfare the policy makers were in conict over. Moreover, the level of
steady-state debt a¤ects the outcome of the negotiations.
For example, at low debt levels the policy maker less concerned with avoid-
ing uctuations in government spending can induce his opponent to accept more
signicant cuts in public consumption as part of a consolidation e¤ort since he
can o¤er other changes in the policy mix which make the policy more palatable.
At higher debt levels, where spending cuts are relatively less e¤ective than other
policy instruments in stabilizing debt, the bargained outcome reduces the re-
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liance on spending cuts to stabilize the debt. While conict over the importance
of reducing volatility in the consumption gap leads to a bargained policy mix
which reduces that volatility, a similar conict over the merits of ination sta-
bilization increases the use of surprise ination as a debt stabilization tool. In
other words, the implications of bargaining across a whole policy mix in an
environment subject to a signicant time-inconsistency problem gives rise to
policy outcomes which are signicantly di¤erent to those implemented by a
single policy with preferences equal to the average of the two players.
Extending the model to include an independent central bank which sets
monetary policy taking the scal policy implemented by two scal players as
given, implies quite di¤erent policy outcomes to the case where a central bank
bargains with a scal authority. A truly independent central bank sets their
policy instruments to maximize their delegated welfare, without caring about
the implications of that policy for the government, except to the extent that
it a¤ects the governments scal policy stance. This implies an aggressive use
of monetary policy to reduce the inationary consequences of scal shocks and
results in the scal players agreeing a slower speed of scal correction. An
ination averse central bank which, instead, bargains with the government over
the setting of macroeconomic policies agrees to relax monetary policy to help
stabilize debt in return for concessions over other aspects of the policy mix. It is
therefore important to assess the degree to which central banks are independent
- do they set policy regardless of the consequences for the governments welfare
or do they reach an implicit bargain with the government when setting policy?
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Appendix 1 - Deriving Social Welfare
(1) Flexible-Price Equilibrium
Prot-maximizing behavior implies that rms will operate at the point at
which marginal costs equal marginal revenues,
  ln(t) = mct
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where the n superscript denotes the exible-price equilibrium. In the steady-
state this reduces to,
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which is identical to the optimal level of employment in the e¢ cient steady-state.
Given the steady-state government spending rule,
G
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the steady-state level of output is given by,
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and, if the subsidy is in place, then the steady-state real wage is given by,
w =
1
1  
The steady-state tax rate required to support a given debt to GDP ratio is
given by,
 =
(1  )B
Y
+ G
Y
1 + (1  )B
Y
+ G
Y
and the tax revenues relative to debt are given by,
wN
b
=

1 
B
Y
This is su¢ cient to dene all log-linearized relationships dependent on model
parameters and the debt to GDP ratio.
(2) Derivation of Social Welfare
Individual utility in period t is
C1 t 
 
t
1   + 
G1 t 
 
t
1    
Nt
1+' t 
N
t
1 + '
Before considering the elements of the utility function we need to note the
following general result relating to second order approximations,
Yt   Y
Yt
= bYt + 1
2
bY 2t +O[2]
where bYt = ln(YtY ), O[2] represents terms that are of order higher than 2 in
the bound on the amplitude of the relevant shocks. This will be used in various
places in the derivation of welfare. Now consider the second order approximation
to the rst term,
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C1 t 
 
t
1   = C
1 

Ct   C
C

  
2
C
1 

Ct   C
C
2
 C1 

Ct   C
C

(t   1) + tip+O[2]
where tip represents terms independent of policy. Using the results above this
can be rewritten in terms of hatted variables,
C1 t 
 
t
1   = C
1 
 bCt + 1
2
(1  ) bC2t    bCtbt+ tip+O[2]
Similarly for the term in government spending,

G1 t 
 
t
1   = G
1 
 bGt + 1
2
(1  ) bG2t    bGtbt+ tip+O[2]
The nal term in labor supply can be written as,
N1+'t 
N
t 
 
t
1 + '
= N
1+'
 bNt + 1
2
(1 + ') bN2t    bNtbt + bNtbNt + tip+O[2]
Now we need to relate the labor input to output and a measure of price
dispersion. Aggregating the individual rmsdemand for labor yields,
Nt =

Yt
At
Z 1
0

Pt(i)
Pt
 
di
It can be shown (see Woodford, 2003, Chapter 6) that
bNt = bYt   at + ln"Z 1
0

Pt(i)
Pt
 
di
#
= bYt   at + 
2
vari (pt(i)) +O[2]
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so we can write
N1+'t 
N
t 
 
t
1 + '
= N
1+'
bYt + 1
2
(1 + ')bY 2t   (1 + ')bYtat + bYtbNt   bYtbt + 2vari (pt(i))

+tip+O[2]
Using these expansions, individual utility can be written as
 t = C
1 
 bCt + 1
2
(1  ) bC2t    bCtbt
+G
1 
 bGt + 1
2
(1  ) bG2t    bGtbt
 N1+'f
bYt + 1
2
(1 + ')bY 2t   (1 + ')bYtat
 bYtbt + bYtbNt + 2vari (pt(i))i
+tip+O[2]
Using second order approximation to the national accounting identity,
 bCt = bYt   (1  ) bGt   1
2
 bC2t   12(1  ) bG2t + 12 bY 2t +O[2]
With the steady-state subsidy in place and government spending chosen
optimally, the following conditions hold in the steady-state, C
1 
C
1 
= N
1+'

and,
G
1 
= N
1+'
(1  )
Which allows us to eliminate the levels terms and rewrite welfare as,
 t = C
1 

 1
2
 bC2t    bCtbtg+ G1 f 12 bG2t    bGtbt

 N1+'

1
2
'bY 2t   (1 + ')bYtat   bYtbt + bYtbNt + 2vari (pt(i))

+tip+O[2]
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We now need to rewrite this in gap form using the FOCs for the social
planner to eliminate the term in the technology shock,
 t =  N1+' 1
2
h
( bCt   bCt )2 + (1  )( bGt   bGt )2 + '(bYt   bY t )2 + vari (pt(i))i
+tip+O[2]
Using the result from Woodford (2003) that
1X
t=0
tvari (pt(i)) =

(1  )(1  )
1X
t=0
t2t + tip+O[2]
we can write the discounted sum of utility as,
  =  N1+' 1
2
E0
1X
t=0
t

( bCt   bCt )2 + (1  )( bGt   bGt )2 + '(bYt   bY t )2 +  2t

+tip+O[2]
(3) The budget constraint using gap variables
The log-linearized budget constraint is given by,
bbt 1   t = bbt   Et ht+1 + ( bCt+1 + bt+1)i
+
wN
b
( bwt + bNt + b t)  G
b
bGt + ( bCt + bt)
Using the labor supply function to eliminate real wages and the denition of
e¢ cient output to eliminate the technology shock,
bbt 1   t = bbt   Et ht+1 + ( bCt+1 + bt+1)i
+( bCt + bt)  G
b
bGt
+
wN
b

(1 + ')(bYt   bY t ) + 11   b t + ( bCt   bCt ) + bY t

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Gapping the remaining variables and combining shock terms,
bbt 1   t = bbt   Et ht+1 + ( bCt+1   bCt+1)i  ft
+( bCt   bCt )  G
b
( bGt   bGt )
+
wN
b

(1 + ')(bYt   bY t ) + 11   (b t   bt ) + ( bCt   bCt )

where
ft =  ( + (1  )(1  ))
 
(1 + ')
 + '
at  
bNt
 + '
!
  wN
b
t   bt
captures the scal consequences of the various shocks hitting the economy.
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Appendix 2 - Proof of Proposition 1
Party i will solve the following Lagrangian:
Li(St 1) = V i(St 1) + i(W j(St 1) X(1  )  V j(St 1))+
m1i(St  D1iSt 1  D2iuit) +m2i(t  C1iSt 1  C2iuit)
where i  0 is the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier (equal to zero when the constraint
is slack), m1i;m2i 2 R are the Lagrangian multipliers, V i(St 1) and W j(St 1)
are as in (31) and (32), with i; j = 1; 2 and i 6= j:
The FOCs of this Lagrangian with respect to uit; t; St and the multipliers
are as follows,
b

Qi0 +Qi + i(Qj0 +Qj)

uit +D2
i0m1i +C2i0m2i = 0 (58)
 2b(Ri + iRj)t +m2i = 0 (59)

@EtC
i(St)
@St
+ i
@EtC
j(St)
@St
+m1i = 0 (60)
i

W j(St 1) X(1  )  V j(St 1)

= 0 (61)
St  D1iSt 1  D2iuit = 0 (62)
t  C1iSt 1  C2iuit = 0 (63)
(i.e., i = 0 for W j(St 1) > X(1  ) + V j(St 1)).
Given EtCi(St) = A   bStiSt in (38), condition (60) can also be written
as follows,
m1i =  b

(i + i0) + i
 
j + j0

St
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This, together with (59), implies that (58) becomes,

Qi0 +Qi + i(Qj0 +Qj) + D2i0

i + i0 + i(j + j0)

D2i
	
uit+ (64)
+2C2i0(Ri + iRj)C2iuit+
+

D2i0

i + i0 + i(j + j0)

D1i + 2C2i0(Ri + iRj)C1i
	
St 1 = 0
or
(E1i + iR1
j)St 1 + (E0i + iR0j)uit = 0
where
E1
3x1
i = 2C2i0RiC1i + D2i0(i + i0)D1i (65)
E0
3x3
i = 2C2i0RiC2i +Qi +Qi0 + D2i0(i + i0)D2i
R1
3x1
j = 2RjC2i0C1i + D2i0(j + j0)D1i (66)
R0
3x2
j = 2RjC2i0C2i +Qj +Qj0 + D2i0(j + j0)D2i
Hence,
uit =  (L0i) 1L1iSt 1 (67)
where LJi = EJi + iRJ
j with J = 0;1; i; j = 1; 2 and i 6= j: This allows us to
obtain uit = O1
iSt 1, as in (39) where
O1i   (L0i) 1L1i (68)
Using the optimal controls (67) in (63), the ination rate can be written as
a linear function of the state:
t = P0
iSt 1 (69)
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where
P0i = C1i +C2iO1i (70)
Similarly, the equation of motion St = D1
iSt 1 +D2iuit becomes
St = G1
iSt 1 (71)
with
G1i = D1i +D2iO1i (72)
We can now derive the guessed coe¢ cients in the forecasts (19). Leading
(69) one period and taking expectations, we can obtain,
Et(t+1) = (q
iP0i + (1  qi)P0j)St
Then, it must be
f i = qiP0i + (1  qi)P0j (73)
for i = 1; 2: This implies that f1 = f2; since q1 = 1  q2:
Similarly, using equation (39) led one period, we obtain,
cgit+1 = O1
i
11St
where O1i11 indicates the rst term of the vector O1
i and therefore,
Et(c
g
t+1) = (q
iO1i11 + (1  qi)O1j11)St
It must be that
ci = qiO1i11 + (1  qi)O1j11 (74)
and again c1 = c2; for q1 = 1  q2:
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The expected value of the game continuation can now be written as a func-
tion of the state variable only:
EtC
i(St) = A  b(G1iSt 1)0iG1iSt 1
Using, the latter, uit = O1
iSt 1, (69) and (71) in the Bellman equation (31),
the value function V i(St 1) can be written as follows:
V i(St 1) = A  b
h
St 1

P0i
0
RiP0i +O1i
0
QiO1i + G1i0iG1i

St 1
i
Given the guessed parameters for the value function (see (36)), then the follow-
ing equation must hold
i = P0i
0
RiP0i +O1i
0
QiO1i + G1i
0
iG1i (75)
Following the same procedure for the expected discounted payo¤ of a responder,
we can obtain an additional equation for the guessed coe¢ cients i with i = 1; 2:
First, we input the optimal control uit = O1
iSt 1 in W j(St 1) to obtain:
W j(St 1) = A  b[(P0iSt 1)0Rj(P0iSt 1) + (O1iSt 1)0Qj(O1iSt 1)+
+ (G1iSt 1)0j(G1iSt 1)]
Then, given the guessed parameters in (37) we can impose the next sets of
equations
j = P0i
0
RjP0i +O1i
0
QjO1i + G1i
0
jG1i (76)
with i; j = 1; 2 and i 6= j:
The sets of equations in i and i together with
i = qii + (1  qi)i (77)
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allow us to obtain 3 2 equations in the 3 2 guessed coe¢ cients (i;i and
i; with i = 1; 2). Finally, to fully determine the guesses we need to solve for
the multiplier i. Condition (61) can be written as:
i((1  )(X  A) + bSt 1(j   j)St 1) = 0 (78)
Generally, for interior solutions (i > 0) the policies will not be time-invariant
(since the multiplier depends on the state, St 1). Also players would potentially
be able to make o¤ers without any concessions (i = 0) when disagreement
disutility is su¢ ciently high, such that
(1  )(X  A) + bSt 1(j   j)St 1 < 0
However, in the most interesting case in which  goes to 1, we have interior
solutions (i > 0) for j = j , for i; j = 1; 2 and i 6= j. Then, the multipliers
are independent of the state and the controls uit are linear (time-invariant)
function of the state.26 To conclude, the multipliers and the guesses are derived
from (75),(76) and (77), with the forecast coe¢ cients as in (73), (74), and the
indi¤erence conditions being written as:
j = j
with  ! 1, for i; j = 1; 2 and i 6= j:
26When countero¤ers tend to be costless, parties make concessions (hence i > 0 and
j = j), as also conrmed in our numerical analysis.
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Appendix 3 - Introducing an Independent Cen-
tral Bank
The rst step is to write the problem in matrix form as before, but split-
ting the controls of the CB from those of the two scal players. The budget
constraint, similarly to (20), becomes
B0iSt = St 1 +

B21;2 B21;3

uit + [B21;1] c
g
t
Then, if at period t, the CB implements its policy, as reected in cgt , and players
agree on party is proposed policy uit, the state St becomes:
St = D1
iSt 1 +D2iuit +D3ic
g
t (79)
with
D1i= [B0
i
] 1
D2i= [B0
i
]
 1

B21;2 B21;3

D3i= [B0
i
]
 1
[B21;1]
Then, using (24),
Ett+1 = A1t +A2uit +A3c
g
t
with
A1 =

1


and,
A2 =

 ((1 )
B
Y
+(1 ))
  '(1 )

A3 =

 (' + )


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This, together with the forecast Et(t+1) = f iSt; implies that ination can be
written as:
t = C1
iSt 1 +C2iuit +C3ic
g
t (80)
where
C1i = [A1]
 1
[f iD1i]
C2i = [A1]
 1
[f iD2i  A2]
C3i = [A1]
 1
[f iD3i  A3]
Therefore, the evolution of the state, government debt, and ination follow a
similar structure to (23) and (25) but where we distinguish the political parties
and CBs controls.
The next step is to set and solve the problems for the political parties and
the CB.
Fiscal AuthoritiesProblem
We begin by considering the bargaining game between the two scal players,
conditional on the policy of the CB. The per-period objective function for party
i in matrix form is as follows:
l(xci ; x
g
i ; x
y
i ; x

i ) = tR
it + c
g
tQ
i
1c
g
t + u
0
itQ
i
2uit + c
g
tQ
i
3uit
71
where
Qi1 = (x
c
i + 'x
y
i )
Qi2 =
2664 0 0
0 (1  )(xgi + 'xyi (1  ))
3775
Qi3 =

0 2(1  )'xyi

Then, the payo¤ to player i when making an acceptable policy uit is
V i0(St 1) = A min
uit
(b(tR
it + c
g
tQ
i
1c
g
t + u
0
itQ
i
2uit + c
g
tQ
i
3uit)
+ EtC
i(St))
Similarly, for player j when accepts the policy uit his payo¤ is
W j0(St 1) = A  b(tRjt + cgtQj1cgt + u0itQj2uit + cgtQj3uit)
+ EtC
j(St)
Hence, the Lagrangian for this problem is as follows:
Li(St 1) = V i(St 1) + i(W j(St 1) X(1  )  V j(St 1))+
m1i(St D1iSt 1 D2iuit D3icgt )+m2i(t C1iSt 1 C2iuit C3icgt )
where i  0, m1i;m2i 2 R with i; j = 1; 2 and i 6= j.
Following the same reasoning as in Appendix 2, the FOCs become
b(Qi0+Qi+i(Qj0+Qj))uit+ c
g
t (Q
i0
3 +iQ
j0
3 )+D2
i0m1i+C2i0m2i = 0 (81)
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 2b(Ri + iRj)t +m2i = 0

@EtC
i(St)
@St
+ i
@EtC
j(St)
@St
+m1i = 0
i(W
j(St 1) X(1  )  V j(St 1)) = 0
and the constraints (79) and (80). Then, the FOC (81) can be re-written as
follows
(E1i + iR1
j)St 1 + (E0i + iR0j)uit + (E2i + iR2j)c
g
t = 0
with
E1
2x1
i = 2C2i0RiC1i + D2i0(i + i0)D1i (82)
E0
2x2
i = 2C2i0RiC2i +Qi2 +Q
i0
2 + D2
i0(i + i0)D2i
E2
2x1
i = 2C2i0RiC3i +Qi03 + D2
i0(i + i0)D3i (83)
R1
2x1
j = 2RjC2i0C1i + D2i0(j + j0)D1i (84)
R0
2x2
j = 2RjC2i0C2i +Qj2 +Q
j0
2 + D2
i0(j + j0)D2i
R2
2x1
j = 2RjC2i0C3i +Qj03 + D2
i0(j + j0)D3i (85)
Hence, the optimal policy uit is a best (bargained) response to CBs control c
g
t ,
uit = O1
iSt 1 +O2ic
g
t (86)
where O1i =  (L0i) 1L1i; O2i =  (L0i) 1L2i with LJi = EJi   iRJj
where J = 0;1;2; i; j = 1; 2 and i 6= j:
The Central Banks Problem
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The problem for the CB is simpler since it does not directly involve any
negotiation. Its problem (conditional on player i making an acceptable o¤er) is
Li(St 1) = V C(St 1) +m1i(St  D1iSt 1  D2iuit  D3icgt )+
m2i(t  C1iSt 1  C2iuit  C3icgt )
with
V C(St 1) = A min
ct
(b(tR
Ct + c
g
tQ
C
1 c
g
t + u
0
itQ
C
2 uit + c
g
tQ
C
3 uit)+
  EtCC(St))
The matrices QCz (and R
C) are dened as Qiz (and R
i respectively) with xgi =
xci = x
y
i = 1 with z = 1; 2; 3. Hence, CB and political parties have exactly the
same matrices QCz = Q
i
z for z = 1; 3, since these are independent of the weights
given to public spending and ination. Let Ci be the guessed parameters for
the central banks value function when political party i is in power
V C(St 1) = A  bS0t 1Ci St 1
Then, given that i will proposed with probability qi next (when the state is St),
the value of the continuation game is
EtC
C(St) = q
iV C(Stji) + (1  qi)V C(Stjj)
= A  bSt 1CSt 1
with
C = qiCi + (1  qi)Cj (87)
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The FOCs with respect to cgt ; t, St and the multipliers are
b(2QC1 c
g
t +Q
C
3 uit) +D3
im1i +C3
im2i = 0 (88)
 2bRCt +m2i = 0
 b(C + C0)St +m1i = 0
and the constraints (79) and (80). Then, FOC (88) can be re-written as follows
E1iCSt 1 +E0
i
Cuit +E2
i
Cc
g
t = 0
E1iC = 2C3
iRCC1i + D3i(C + C0)D1i (89)
E0iC = 2C3
iRCC2i +QC3 + D3
i(C + C0)D2i
E2iC = 2C3
iRCC3i + 2QC1 + D3
i(C + C0)D3i (90)
Then, the optimal control for CB is a best response to the political parties
agreed policy uit and a function of the state St 1 :
cgt = O1
i
CSt 1 +O2
i
Cuit (91)
with
O1iC =  (E2iC) 1E1iC
O2iC =  (E2iC) 1E0iC
The Solution
Next, we solve the two best responses in (86) and (91), simultaneously, to
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obtain
uit = O1
i
BSt 1 (92)
cgt = O1
i
CBSt 1 (93)
where
O1iB = [I O2iO2iC ] 1
 
O1i +O2iO1iC

(94)
O1iCB = O1
i
C +O2
i
CO1
i
B (95)
Then, using the optimal controls (92) and (93), the ination rate, in equilibrium,
is given by:
t = P0
i
CBSt 1
where
P0iCB = C1
i +C2iO1iB +C3
iO1iCB (96)
Similarly, for the equation of motion (79):
St = G1
i
CBSt 1
with
G1iCB = D1
i +D2iO1iB +D3
iO1iCB (97)
The guessed coe¢ cients in the forecasts are also linear:
Et(t+1) = (q
iP0iCB + (1  qi)P0jCB)St
with
f = qiP0iCB + (1  qi)P0jCB (98)
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and
Et(c
g
t+1) = (q
iO1iCB + (1  qi)O1jCB)St
with
c = qiO1iCB + (1  qi)O1jCB (99)
The guessed coe¢ cients in the forecasts (c and f) are the same for the two
political parties and CB. Finally, the guessed coe¢ cients for the payo¤s are as
follows:
i = P0i
0
CBR
iP0iCB +O1
i0
CBQ
i
1O1
i
CB +O1
i0
BQ
i
2O1
i
B (100)
+O1i0CBQ
i
3O1
i
B + G1
i0
CB
iG1iCB
j = P0i
0
CBR
jP0iCB +O1
i0
CBQ
j
1O1
i
CB +O1
i0
BQ
j
2O1
i
B (101)
+O1i0CBQ
j
3O1
i
B + G1
i0
CB
jG1iCB
CBi = P0
i0
CBR
CP0iCB +O1
i0
CBQ
C
1 O1
i
CB +O1
i0
BQ
C
2 O1
i
B (102)
+O1i0CBQ
C
3 O1
i
B + G1
i0
CB
CG1iCB
The MPE is, then, given by solving the set of equations in i;i and CBi in
(100)-(102) together with, rst,
i = qii + (1  qi)i (103)
second, the equivalent for CB, C in (87) and, third, the acceptance condition
as in (61), which for D = (1  )X; and for i > 0 is:
j = j
for i; j = 1; 2 and i 6= j:
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Appendix 4 - Non-Separability of Public and
Private Consumption.
(1)Changes to the Model
As a result of introducing non-separable utility, the log-linearized version of
the consumption Euler equation (5) can be written as
beCt + bt = EtbeCt+1 + bt+1  1 (rt   Et (t+1)) (104)
where eCt = Ct+Gt such that  < (>)0 implies private and public consumption
are complements (substitutes), hatted variables denote percentage deviations
from steady-state, rt = Rt    where  = 1   1, and t = pt   pt 1 is price
ination.
Similarly, the householdslabor supply decision and is given by,
  
1   b t + bwt = ' bNt + beCt + bNt
Market clearing is as before, but can be written in terms of the adjusted
consumption variable, eCt, before being log-linearized as,
bYt = 0beCt + (1  0) bGt
where we now dene 0 = eC
Y
and 1  0 = (1  )G
Y
:
The budget constraint is linearized as,
bbt 1   t = [bbt   Etft+1 + (beCt+1 + bt+1)g] (105)
+(
beCt + bt) + wN
b
( bwt + bNt + b t)  G
b
bGt
78
and the NKPC becomes,
t = Ett+1 + (cmct + bt)
where  = (1 p)(1 p)p , cmct =  at + bwt = ' bNt + beCt + bNt + 1  b t   at, are
the real log-linearized marginal costs of production, and b is a mark-up shock
representing the temporary deviation of the desired markup from its steady-
state value.
As a result the model is essentially unchanged except for the redenition of
the consumption variable to account for the impact of public consumption on
household utility from private consumption, and the resultant reinterpretation
of parameter 0. However, we need to re-derive the policy problem to ensure this
is also amended appropriately as a result of this change to household preferences.
To do so we initially consider the social planners problem, map that solution to
the exible-price equilibrium, rewrite the model in gap form and then construct
a measure of social welfare.
(2)Social Planners Problem:
The social planner is not constrained by the price mechanism and simply
maximizes the representative households utility, (55), subject to the technology,
(7), and resource constraints, (9). This yields the following rst order conditions,
( eCt )  = 1   (Gt ) 
( eCt )    Y 't A (1+')t Nt = 0
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where we retain use of the *superscript to denote the e¢ cient level of that
variable. These can be log-linearized around the e¢ cient steady-state, and given
the national accounting identity we obtain,
bY t =  1 + ' + '

at   1
 + '
bNt
and,
bY t = beCt = bGt
Therefore the social planner takes account of the impact of public goods pro-
vision on the utility obtained from private consumption in setting the balance
between private and public consumption.
(3) Flexible Price Equilibrium
Prot-maximizing behavior implies that rms will operate at the point at
which marginal costs equal marginal revenues,
  ln(t) = mct
1  1


=
(1  {)
(1   t) (N
n
t )
'A 1t ( eCnt )Nt
In the steady-state this reduces to,
1  1


=
(1  {)
(1  ) (N
n
)'( eCn)
If the subsidy { is given by
(1  {) = (1  1

)(1  )
then  eCn  = (Nn)'
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which is identical to the optimal level of employment in the e¢ cient steady-state.
Given the steady-state government spending rule,
G
Y
=
 
1   +


1  
  1! 1
the steady-state level of output is given by,
Y = N = (1 + (1  ) 1  1 ) +'
and, if the subsidy is in place, then the steady-state real wage is given by,
w =
1
1  
The steady-state tax rate required to support a given debt to GDP ratio is
given by,
 =
(1  )B
Y
+ G
Y
1 + (1  )B
Y
+ G
Y
and the tax revenues relative to debt are given by,
wN
b
=

1 
B
Y
This is su¢ cient to dene all log-linearized relationships dependent on model
parameters and the debt to GDP ratio. Therefore the same form of subsidy in
combination with a government spending rule which takes account of the impact
of public consumption on private utility ensures the steady state of our sticky
price economy is e¢ cient. This enables us to rewrite the model in a gap form
which is isomorphic to the original model with cvt =
beCt   beCt which replaces
cgt = bCt   bCt and  = eCY rather than CY :
(4)Social Welfare:
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Using the results above the term in adjusted consumption can be approxi-
mated to a second order as,
eC1 t  t
1   =
eC1  beCt + 1
2
(1  )beC2t   beCtbt+ tip+O[2]
Similarly for the separable term in government spending,

G1 t 
 
t
1   = G
1 
 bGt + 1
2
(1  ) bG2t    bGtbt+ tip+O[2]
The nal term in labor supply can be written as,
N1+'t 
N
t 
 
t
1 + '
= N
1+'
 bNt + 1
2
(1 + ') bN2t    bNtbt + bNtbNt + tip+O[2]
These can be combined as,
 t = eC1  beCt + 1
2
(1  )beC2t   beCtbt
+G
1 
 bGt + 1
2
(1  ) bG2t    bGtbt
 N1+'
bYt + 1
2
(1 + ')bY 2t   (1 + ')bYtat
 bYtbt + bYtbNt + 2vari (pt(i))
+tip+O[2]
Using second order approximation to the national accounting identity,

c0 eCt = bYt   (1  0) bGt   1
2
0beC2t   12(1  0) bG2t + 12 bY 2t +O[2]
With the steady-state subsidy in place and government spending chosen
optimally, the following conditions hold in the steady-state,
eC1  = N1+'0
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and,
G
1 
= N
1+'
(1  0)
Which allows us to eliminate the levels terms and rewrite welfare as,
 t = eC1 f 1
2

beC2t   beCtbtg+ G1 f 12 bG2t    bGtbtg
 N1+'f1
2
'bY 2t   (1 + ')bYtat   bYtbt + bYtbNt + 2varifpt(i)gg
+tip+O[2]
We now need to rewrite this in gap form using the FOCs for the social planner
to eliminate the term in the technology shock,
 t =  N1+' 1
2

0(beCt   beCt )2 + (1  0)( bGt   bGt )2 + '(bYt   bY t )2 + vari (pt(i))
+tip+O[2]
Using the result from Woodford (2003) that
1X
t=0
tvari (pt(i)) =
0
(1  0)(1  0)
1X
t=0
t2t + tip+O[2]
we can write the discounted sum of utility as,
  =  N1+' 1
2
E0
1X
t=0
t

0(beCt   beCt )2 + (1  0)( bGt   bGt )2 + '(bYt   bY t )2 +  2t

+tip+O[2]
In other words, the problem is isomorphic to the original problem but with
private consumption, cgt , replaced with private consumption adjusted for the
impact of government spending, cvt , and the parameter  replaced by 
0 = eC
Y
.
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Figure 1: MPE Coe¢ cients and Conict over Ination Stabilization
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Notes: The gure plots equilibrium coe¢ cients that multiply debt, bt 1, against
the degree of conict, x, expressed as a percentage. The solid blue line - low
debt of 20% of GDP, red dashed line - medium debt of 50% of GDP, green circles
- high debt of 80% of GDP.
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Figure 2: Ination Conict and Bargaining - Low Debt
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Notes: Impulse response functions to a positive (10%) debt shock, for a debt-
GDP ratio of 20%, with conict over ination stabilization. The red dashed line
reects the case without conict/bargaining. The solid blue line is the bargained
outcome with conict over ination stabilization of x = 20%.
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Figure 3: Ination Conict and Bargaining - High Debt
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Notes: Impulse response functions to a positive (10%) debt shock, for a debt-
GDP ratio of 80%, with conict over ination stabilization. The red dashed line
reects the case without conict/bargaining. The solid blue line is the bargained
outcome with conict over ination stabilization of x = 20%.
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Figure 4: MPE Coe¢ cients and Conict over Monetary Policy
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Notes: The gure plots equilibrium coe¢ cients that multiply debt, bt 1, against
the degree of conict, x, expressed as a percentage. The solid blue line - low
debt of 20% of GDP, red dashed line - medium debt of 50% of GDP, green circles
- high debt of 80% of GDP.
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Figure 5: Monetary Policy Conict and Bargaining - Low Debt
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Notes: Impulse response functions to a positive (10%) debt shock, for a debt-
GDP ratio of 20%, with conict over the consumption gap - the de fact in-
strument of monetary policy. The red dashed line reects the case without
conict/bargaining. The solid blue line is the bargained outcome with conict
over ination stabilization of x = 20%.
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Figure 6: Monetary Policy Conict and Bargaining - High Debt
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Notes: Impulse response functions to a positive (10%) debt shock, for a debt-
GDP ratio of 80%, with conict over the consumption gap - the de fact in-
strument of monetary policy. The red dashed line reects the case without
conict/bargaining. The solid blue line is the bargained outcome with conict
over ination stabilization of x = 20%.
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Figure 7: MPE Coe¢ cients and Conict over Public Consumption
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Notes: The gure plots equilibrium coe¢ cients that multiply debt, bt 1, against
the degree of conict, x, expressed as a percentage. The solid blue line - low
debt of 20% of GDP, red dashed line - medium debt of 50% of GDP, green circles
- high debt of 80% of GDP.
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Figure 8: Government Consumption Conict and Bargaining
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Notes: Impulse response functions to a positive (10%) debt shock, for a debt-
GDP ratio of 20% and 80%, with conict over the public consumption gap. The
red dashed line reects the case without conict/bargaining. The solid blue line
is the bargained outcome with conict over government spending stabilization
of x = 20%.
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Figure 9: Fiscal Bargaining and an Independent Central Bank
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Notes: Impulse response functions for a positive (10%) debt shock, for debt-
GDP ratio of 25%, with conict both over government spending gap stabilization
(xg (in percentage) = 20%) and ination stabilization (for scal players, xi =
100%; for any i = 1; 2 and for CB, xCB = 100 + x). Solid blue line - central
bank preferences mirror social welfare, x = 0%; red dashed line - ination
averse central bank, x = 25%; and green circles - ination averse central bank,
x = 50%.
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Figure 10: Conict over Public Consumption and Non-Separable Utility
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Notes: Impulse response functions for a positive (10%) debt shock, for debt-
GDP ratio of 25%, with conict over government spending gap stabilization (xg
(in percentage) = 20%) with di¤erent degrees of substitutability between private
and public consumption in utility, u(Ct+Gt). Solid blue line - v = 0:23 (private
and public consumption are substitutes); red dashed line - v = 0 (separable
utility); and v =  0:23 (private and public consumption are complements).
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